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an innovation is made, a contract is negotiated and unobservable eﬀort must
be exerted to develop a product. In the absence of liability constraints, the
inventor’s investment incentives are increasing in his bargaining power. Yet,
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ment incentives may be decreasing in his bargaining power.
Keywords: hold-up problem, incomplete contracts, research and development,
limited liability
JEL Classification: D86; L23; O31
∗ Department of Economics, University of Cologne, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Köln,
Germany. E-mail: <patrick.schmitz@uni-koeln.de>. I have benefitted from very helpful
discussions with Eva Hoppe.
1
1 Introduction
The hold-up problem plays a key role in the incomplete contracting literature
(see Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995).1 In a
standard hold-up problem, there are two parties who tomorrow can generate
a surplus. One of the two parties can today make an investment in order to
increase the surplus that can be generated tomorrow. Suppose the investment
is completely relationship-specific; i.e., it does not yield a return outside of the
relationship between the two parties under consideration. Moreover, suppose
that today no contracts can be written, so that the two parties can negotiate a
contract only tomorrow, after the investment is sunk. If the investing party has
all the bargaining power tomorrow, it will extract the total surplus generated
in the relationship, so today it has first-best investment incentives. However,
if the investing party has no bargaining power tomorrow, then the other party
will extract the total surplus, so that today the investment incentives are zero.
This is the hold-up problem in its most severe form. In general, the investment
incentives today are the larger the more bargaining power the investing party
tomorrow will have.
In the present paper, we show that these simple insights need no longer hold
if the creation of the surplus tomorrow involves a moral hazard problem and the
investing party is protected by limited liability. In this case, if the non-investing
party has all the bargaining power, the investment incentives today may be
too strong compared to the first-best benchmark. In particular, the investment
incentives may then be decreasing in the investing party’s bargaining power.
We consider the relationship between an inventor and a costumer (in the
spirit of Aghion and Tirole, 1994a, 1994b). In a first stage, the inventor can
invest basic research eﬀort to come up with an innovation. There are two
possibilities. Either a high-quality innovation or only a low-quality innovation
is made. After the innovation has been observed by both parties, the devel-
1See also Schmitz (2001) for a literature review. For experimental evidence, see Hoppe
and Schmitz (2011).
2
opment of a final product based on the innovation becomes contractible. At
this point in time, a contract is negotiated, and we are interested in the eﬀects
of the inventor’s bargaining power on his incentives to invest. What distin-
guishes our set-up from a standard hold-up problem is that once the innovation
is made, further development eﬀort must be spent, which is unobservable. In
line with Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), a high-quality innovation leads
to larger potential benefits, but also to larger eﬀort costs compared to a low-
quality innovation. Only the outcome of the development stage (i.e., whether
or not a marketable final product is developed) is verifiable, so that there is a
moral hazard problem.
We show that if there are no liability constraints, then the moral hazard
stage does not cause any frictions and the solution has the usual characteris-
tics of a standard hold-up problem. In particular, the inventor’s investment
incentives are increasing in his bargaining power. Yet, if the inventor has no
wealth and is protected by limited liability, then overinvestments compared to
the first-best solution may occur, and the inventor’s investment incentives can
be decreasing in his bargaining power.
2 The model
There are two risk-neutral parties, party A and party B. In line with Aghion
and Tirole (1994a, 1994b), party A might be an inventor (say, a biotechnology
start-up firm), while party B might be a customer (say, a pharmaceutical
company). The reservation utilities of both parties are zero. At some initial
date 1, party A can invest eﬀort i ∈ [0, 1] in basic research activities, where
party A’s eﬀort costs are given by ψ(i), with ψ(0) = ψ0(0) = 0, ψ0(i) > 0 and
ψ00(i) > 0 for i > 0, and limi→1 ψ0(i) =∞. At date 2, party A comes up with a
high-quality innovation with probability i, while only a low-quality innovation
is made with probability 1−i. Following the incomplete contracting approach,
we assume that at date 1 no contract can be written, while contracting becomes
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possible at date 2.2 At date 3, based on the innovation observed by both
parties at date 2, party A can exert unobservable eﬀort e ∈ {el, eh} to develop
a marketable final product, where 0 < el < eh < 1. Party A’s eﬀort costs at
date 3 are c if e = eh, and zero otherwise. Finally, at date 4 with probability
e the development is successful, so that party B’s benefit is b, while with
probability 1− e there is no success and party B’s benefit is zero.
The eﬀort costs c which are incurred by party A if it exerts high eﬀort at
date 3 as well as the benefit b that party B obtains in case of a successful
development at date 4 depend on whether at date 2 a low-quality or a high-
quality innovation was made. Specifically, in line with Hart, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1997), we assume that a high-quality innovation at date 2 improves
the potential benefit b (which is desirable), but it also increases the associated
eﬀort costs c (which is an undesirable side-eﬀect). In particular, b = bh and
c = ch in case of a high-quality innovation, while b = bl and c = cl in case of
a low-quality innovation, where bh > bl > 0 and ch > cl > 0. To focus the
analysis on the most interesting case, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. ehbh − ch > ehbl − cl.
Assumption 1 ensures that if high eﬀort is exerted at date 3, then the ex-
pected total surplus is larger in case of a high-quality innovation; i.e., the fact
that a high-quality innovation comes along with larger eﬀort costs is overcom-
pensated by the larger benefit.
Assumption 2. (eh−el)bh > ch+chel/(eh−el) and (eh−el)bl > cl+clel/(eh−
el).
In particular, Assumption 2 guarantees that at date 3 it is always desirable
to exert high instead of low eﬀort, because the corresponding increase of the
expected benefit (eh−el)b is larger than the eﬀort costs c, regardless of whether
there is a high-quality or a low-quality innovation.3
2See Hart and Moore (1999), Maskin and Tirole (1999), and Tirole (1999) for discussions
of the incomplete contracting paradigm that was developed by Grossman and Hart (1986).
3Moreover, Assumption 2 also ensures that high eﬀort will always be implemented even
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In a first-best world in which eﬀort was verifiable, Assumption 2 thus im-
plies that at date 3 high eﬀort would always be exerted, eFB = eh. Moreover,
at date 1 the first-best investment level is characterized by
iFB = argmax i(ehbh − ch) + (1− i)(ehbl − cl)− ψ(i). (1)
Thus,
ψ0(iFB) = eh(bh − bl)− (ch − cl). (2)
In the remainder of the paper, we consider a second-best world in which the
parties agree on a contract after the innovation at date 2 is made. Specifically,
we assume that with probability α ∈ [0, 1] party A can make a take-it-or-
leave-it contract oﬀer to party B, while with probability 1−α party B makes
a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to party A. Thus, party A’s bargaining power in the
contract negotiations at date 2 is given by the parameter α.4
3 No liability constraints
As a benchmark, we first consider the case in which there are no (binding)
wealth constraints. At date 2, both parties have observed whether a high-
quality innovation (b = bh, c = ch) or only a low-quality innovation (b = bl,
c = cl) was made. Now the parties negotiate a contract. Let the contractually
specified transfer payment from party B to party A be given by t1 if at date 4
there is a success and by t0 if there is a failure.
At date 3, party A exerts high eﬀort whenever the incentive compatibility
constraint
eht1 + (1− eh)t0 − c ≥ elt1 + (1− el)t0 (3)
when party A is protected by limited liability. In the latter case, party A can only be
motivated to exert high eﬀort if in addition to a reimbursement of its eﬀort costs c it also
gets a “limited liability rent” cel/(eh − el); see footnote 7 and condition (8) below.
4This simple bargaining game has also been used by Ma (1994) in a moral hazard frame-
work. See Hart and Moore (1999), Bajari and Tadelis (2001), and Schmitz (2006) for further
applications in incomplete contracting settings.
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is satisfied, which can be rewritten as (eh − el)(t1 − t0) ≥ c. Moreover, the
participation constraints are given by
eht1 + (1− eh)t0 − c ≥ 0 (4)
for party A and
eh(b− t1)− (1− eh)t0 ≥ 0 (5)
for party B, respectively.
Note that if party A can make the contract oﬀer at date 2, then it can
extract the expected total surplus ehb − c by setting t0 = ehb − ehc/(eh − el)
and t1 = t0+c/(eh−el). If partyB makes the oﬀer, then at date 2 it can extract
the expected total surplus by setting t0 = −elc/(eh−el) and t1 = t0+c/(eh−el).
Hence, at date 1, party A’s expected payoﬀ is5
iα(ehbh − ch) + (1− i)α(ehbl − cl)− ψ(i). (6)
The investment level iSB(α) is thus implicitly characterized by
ψ0(iSB(α)) = α[eh(bh − bl)− (ch − cl)]. (7)
Note that Assumption 1 ensures that the right-hand side is non-negative.
Given convexity of ψ(i), it follows immediately that iSB(α) is an increasing
function.
Proposition 1 Suppose that there are no wealth constraints. Then party A’s
investment incentives are always increasing in its bargaining power α.
Observe that iSB(1) = iFB and iSB(0) = 0. Thus, the first-best solution
is achieved if party A has all the bargaining power (α = 1). In contrast,
the hold-up problem is most severe if party B has all the bargaining power
(α = 0). In the latter case, at date 1 party A anticipates that the total returns
of its investments will go to party B, so that it has no incentives to invest.
These simple insights are well in line with the standard properties of hold-up
problems discussed in the incomplete contracting literature.
5Observe that our simple non-cooperative bargaining game implies that at date 2 the
expected surplus is split according to the generalized Nash bargaining solution, where α is
party A’s bargaining power (see e.g. Muthoo, 1999).
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4 Limited liability
Now suppose that party A has no wealth, so that the limited liability con-
straints t0 ≥ 0 and t1 ≥ 0 must be satisfied in addition to the incentive
compatibility and participation constraints.6
If at date 2 party A can make the contract oﬀer, it can still extract the
expected total surplus by setting t0 = ehb−ehc/(eh−el) and t1 = t0+c/(eh−el).
Note that t0 ≥ 0, since (eh−el)b > cmust hold by Assumption 2. Now suppose
that at date 2 party B can make the contract oﬀer. If it wants to implement
e = eh, party B will set t0 = 0 and t1 = c/(eh − el), so that its expected
profit is eh(b− c/(eh − el)).7 Alternatively, it can implement e = el by setting
t0 = t1 = 0, yielding an expected profit of elb. It is thus more profitable to
implement high eﬀort whenever the condition
(eh − el)b ≥ ehc/(eh − el) (8)
is satisfied, which is ensured by Assumption 2 for both types of innovation.
Hence, party A’s expected payoﬀ at date 1 is
i[α(ehbh − ch) + (1− α)(ehch/(eh − el)− ch)]
+(1− i)[α(ehbl − cl) + (1− α)(ehcl/(eh − el)− cl)]− ψ(i). (9)
The investment level iLL(α) chosen by party A at date 1 is implicitly charac-
terized by
ψ0(iLL(α)) = α[eh(bh − bl)− (ch − cl)] + (1− α)(ch − cl)el/(eh − el). (10)
Note that again iLL(1) = iFB, but now iLL(0) is strictly positive.
6On moral hazard models with limited liability constraints, see also Innes (1990) and
Pitchford (1994). See also Laﬀont and Martimort (2002) for an excellent textbook exposi-
tion.
7Observe that if it wants to implement high eﬀort, party B cannot extract the total
surplus. Instead, it must leave an expected rent ehc/(eh − el) − c = cel/(eh − el) > 0 to
party A. Laﬀont and Martimort (2002) call such a rent an agent’s “limited liability rent.”
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Observe that (ch − cl)el/(eh − el) > eh(bh − bl) − (ch − cl), and hence
iLL(0) > iFB, whenever the condition [ehbh − ch] − [ehbl − cl] < el(bh − bl) is
satisfied. We can thus state our main result.
Proposition 2 Suppose that party A is protected by limited liability. If [ehbh−
ch]−[ehbl−cl] < el(bh−bl), then party A’s investment incentives are decreasing
in its bargaining power α. Otherwise, party A’s investment incentives are
increasing in α.
Hence, if the net social gain ehb−c of the high-quality innovation compared
to the low-quality innovation is suﬃciently small, then party A’s investment
is larger when it has less bargaining power, which is in stark contrast to the
standard finding in the literature on hold-up problems.8
The reason for the counter-intuitive result is as follows. In the presence of
limited liability, even when party B has all the bargaining power, it cannot
extract the total surplus at date 2, since it must leave a rent to party A in
order to induce high eﬀort. The higher the eﬀort costs of party A, the larger
must be the rent that induces party A to exert high eﬀort. Hence, at date
1 party A can have too strong incentives to invest compared to the first-best
solution, because party A is only interested in increasing the costs c, regardless
of the eﬀect than an innovation has on the benefit b. In contrast, if party A
has all the bargaining power, then at date 2 it will extract the total surplus,
so that overinvestment at date 1 can never occur.9
8Note that the condition in Proposition 2 may well be satisfied given the assumptions
made. For example, let eh = 0.8, el = 0.1, bh = 50, bl = 10, ch = 30, and cl = 1.
9To avoid tedious case distinctions, we have focused the analysis on the most interesting
case in which high eﬀort will always be implemented. The cases in which Assumption 2 is
not satisfied can be analyzed analogously. For instance, suppose that cl < (eh− el)bl < cl+
clel/(eh−el), so that in case of a low-quality innovation party B would implement low eﬀort
only, which is a reasonable possibility. Then iLL(0) > iFB holds if [ehbh− ch]− [ehbl− cl] <
el(bh − bl) + clel/eh. Thus, party A’s investment incentives can again be decreasing in its
bargaining power.
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5 Conclusion
In a standard hold-up problem, the investing party typically has insuﬃcient
incentives to invest compared to the first-best solution. Moreover, the invest-
ments are increasing in the investing party’s bargaining power. These basic
insights are also true when after the investment stage unobservable eﬀort must
be exerted to generate a surplus, provided there are no liability constraints.
Yet, in the presence of limited liability, there may be overinvestments and the
investments may decrease in the investing party’s bargaining power.10
10For related results, see also Kräkel and Schöttner (2010), who show that excessive eﬀort
may be induced in sequential moral hazard settings with minimum wages. Moreover, Schmitz
(2008) shows that in a hold-up setting investment incentives may decrease in the investing
party’s bargaining power if there is two-sided asymmetric information (i.e., there is an
adverse selection problem) when the surplus is created.
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